The American Sharpe Page 13
12th The enemy’s picquet in my front commenced working last night at about 8 o’clock and continued at it all night. When day broke this morning I discovered four embrasures open in a work, they about an hour after stopped the embrasures with bushes & continued working all day, which I believe is all for show. However it created an alarm in the chateau & everything was disposed to receive an immediate attack, the enemy did at one time show a great force opposite the division.
There was a great deal of firing at one time on the left in which I hear the Guards suffered very severely & brought it all on themselves by firing on a battalion that was relieving some post. I was relieved this evening on picquet by Cox6. Fine day.
13th The enemy retired last night and took up their old line of picquets that they occupied previous to their attack on the 10th. Our picquets felt their way on and occupied their old line. As soon as it was daylight I went up and found poor Hopwoods’ body, which the enemy had scarcely covered over & buried it. Poor fellow!
Soon after day light [I] heard heavy firing in the direction of where General Hill is, which continued almost all day.
Lord Wellington rode by in that direction at about 10 o’clock and ordered the 4th Division to move up. I understand and a deserter also said that Soult has brought his provisions to his army by boats down the Adour and that he has no other sufficient conveyance for them, so that General Hill’s movement upon the Adour by depriving him of this resource puts him to a very great inconvenience and I suppose all his manoeuvres now have in view this end viz to force General Hill from the line of the Adour. His attack on our left on the 10th was probably made under the idea that that point had been weakened in order to strengthen General Hill’s attack the preceding day on the right and last night he concentrated his principal force to attack General Hill this morning but he was I understand repulsed with very great loss. There is a report that he had 18 companies of grenadiers ready to storm the church and chateau of Arcangues, the battery they constructed opposite our picquet is a complete humbug.
I was sent with the company to occupy our old cantonment but was afterwards ordered back to the chateau. The picquets are taken by brigades now not battalions, because [of] that when our battalion is on picquet the post is weaker than at any other time, the chateau being unoccupied. Fine day.
14th Lord Wellington came to the chateau today from the direction of General Hill and seemed in very light spirits, I heard him say to General Kempt that the enemy had been four times repulsed with immense loss, General Hill had only his own corps up. They (the enemy) were I understand all drunk when they attacked. All quiet today. The number of deserters that come in is very great. Rainy.
15th The company on outlying picquet today at the old place. Everything is as before, the enemy appear very much afraid of being attacked, they saw some guns move to our right & they fell in their outposts & manned their work. One of the enemy’s sentries opposite my picquet deserted from his post today about 3 o’clock to the picquet on my right. While I was at my dinner a man came up & told me that the officer of the French picquet wanted to speak to me, I accordingly went down & passed the abattis. Two officers of the 55th [French] Regiment came to meet me, we shook hands very cordially & when I asked them if they wanted anything, they produced a keg of brandy & saw they only came to drink my health & chat a little, which after doing we parted, they were very civil. Rainy day.
16th Relieved this morning by the company of the 17th [Portuguese Line] and went & occupied the reserve post. Rainy.
17th Relieved this morning, our old cantonment is given up to the Portuguese working party, there is a battery making in the garden of the chateau & another at the church. Fine day. General Hill’s head quarters are at Vieux Mouguerre
18th Rainy night, fine day, I went in to the French picquet today to take a letter for the officer of ours [Church] who was taken on the 10th.
19th Very bad weather.
20th Ditto. We are all to dine together on Christmas day.
21st Ditto.
22nd Went on a working party with the company to the neighbourhood of Arbonne just in rear of Pue7 to make roads. These roads are making under the superintendence of the Staff Corps & are to extend from the main road in rear of the position we are fortifying, to the road from Bayonne to Roncesvalles. I was in the battery today at the church of Arcangues, there are nine guns in it, 5 of which are French ship guns & 4 are long English brass 6 pounders, it is very strong. The wood below it, which is of young trees, very thickly planted, is cut down about 3 feet from the ground and the trees laid along, which makes a most impenetrable abattis. The battery at the chateau is not yet finished, it is I believe to mount (en barbette8) two 24 pound carronades & 1 x 5½ inch howitzer.
The desertions from the enemy still continue to be very great, 3 came in to our picquets last night & 3 the night before, and not only foreigners but Frenchmen are among the number.
23rd Rainy.
24th First fine day since the 18th. An officer (an Englishman) of the Portuguese artillery went by our house today & said that it was positively certain that we go on tomorrow morning when a signal gun will be fired. Nobody else knows anything of it, which is very strange, but it is said positively that Soult has retired from the line of the Adour, leaving here only the men he intends to occupy Bayonne. In this case it is most it is most probable we shall soon move.
A German who was taken today in coming to talk to our advanced sentry at which he was very much vexed, told me that there were 3 divisions on this side of the river. It is very strange that after all that happened it is not yet clearly understood among the foreigners of the French army do not generally know whether to believe that their country is against France or not. When you ask them if Bonaparte has been obliged to cross the Rhine, they say they have heard it, but do not know whether to believe it or not. Several pontoons passed by our house to the right today.
25th Our company relieved the outpost today, fine day, hard frost last night.
Edward Costello records that a man of his company was guilty this night of fraternising with the enemy too much. They did however manage somehow to retrieve the situation without the knowledge of the officer commanding the picket, our James: ‘On Christmas night, our company was on picket near a dwelling called Garrett’s house. We clubbed half a dollar each, and sent Grindley, our comrade, into the French picket-house to purchase brandy, but when he stayed longer than was usual, we became alarmed and sent two other men in quest of him. From the nearest French sentry, they learned that Grindley was lying drunk in their picket-house. Fearful that the circumstances should come to the knowledge of Lieutenant Gardiner, the officer of our picket, they went to bring him back with them Grindley was very drunk, and just as they were emerging with him from the French lines, who should ride down to the front post but Sir James Kempt, who commanded our division at that time, Grindley was instantly ordered to be confined; he was very fortunate to escape with only a slight punishment’’.9
26th On outlying picquet today, same weather. The enemy are eternally drilling now so that they must have received some part of the new conscription.
27th Relieved this morning.
28th The Church of Arcangues is now one of the strongest works I ever saw, it is absolutely un-attackable.
29th Blank
30th Rode to St Jean de Luz today, heard on the road that the enemy had withdrawn their picquets which were opposite our division into the entrenched camp. While we were in St Jean de Luz there came a report there from General Alten that the enemy were forming up columns opposite to him & that he apprehended an attack, this report as usual lost nothing by the distance it came, the Guards were ordered to fall in & everybody had it that the division was attacked, which made us all bolt off, however we had not got 3 miles on the road when we heard that it was all a false alarm and that the columns they showed were to protect any attack that might be made on them in consequence of their withdrawing their picquets; which by the bye is a very
curious circumstance & I can imagine no reason for it, except that by contracting their line of outposts they may prevent the frequent desertions they have lately had.
The turn of the year spent in winter quarters allowed James the time to review what had been a stunningly successful year for Wellington.
31st The enemy were very much offended yesterday when our picquets occupied the ground they gave up and said they retired in order to have some space of neutral ground between us, however they did not fire and General Alten has agreed with them, that our picquets are to occupy the ground they gave up during the day and retire to the old ground again at night. We had a dance this night at the chateau to bring in the New Year.
Thus have we seen an end of the year 1813 and of a more glorious, active and eventful era the annals of history do not furnish a second. Our own Peninsular campaign has been eminently successful, the 21st of May saw the allied armies on the banks of the Agueda and the 9th of December on that of the Adour after having been victorious in three general actions and become masters of two regular fortresses, the one by siege & the other by blockade not to mention the Castle of Burgos which the enemy abandoned, and which last year resisted the efforts of that same army at the approach of which it this year fell without an effort.
This campaign though attended with unexampled success has not been marked by one single instance of those unexpected throws of fortune which disarrange the best concerted measures and which turn the scale of success instantaneously from one side to another. We have had no instance of disaffection among our enemies (except indeed the desertion of the Nassau Brigade on the 10th ultimo, a circumstance in itself too trifling to have at all influenced the success of operations in general and which did not take place until the event of the campaign was determined), no unexpected losses by weather or other unforeseen accidents. All has been general-ship and manoeuvring, every advantage has been looked forward to and calculated upon and in the history of war there never has I believe been a campaign which affords a finer lesson for a soldier, in which so much has been effected by the genius of the commander and so little has been owing to luck or chance.
At the same time however that the measures of Lord Wellington were projected with sagacity and executed with vigour, those of the French commanders (until Marshal Soult took the command) appear to have been palsied by irresolution & inaction.
The campaign commenced on the 21st of May. A part of the army (the 2nd & Light Divisions) moved on the old (and what the enemy expected would be the only) route, viz on Salamanca while the greater part under General Graham crossing the Douro in Portugal, thereby turning that line of defence, moved on the Esla. And in contemplating this manoeuvre must we not pay the tribute of admiration to the foresight of Lord Wellington, was not the very cantonment of the troops destined to move on this point a preliminary and necessary step, in all our former winters we have had the right of our army extended a considerable way towards the south of Spain, this winter it extended no further than Coria & thereabouts while the left was cantoned on the Douro, and what the enemy imagined to be taken up only as a convenient cantonment was in fact occupying a post which enabled Lord Wellington as soon as he commenced the campaign to turn one of the enemy’s strongest lines of defence, on which they most probably calculated to keep the British army in check until they had collected and arranged their troops to dispute seriously passage of the Ebro.
The 2nd and our division marched on Salamanca, we found General Maucune there with a division who for what cause I know not stayed there, with his own division only and with none other within two days march of him, long enough to lose upwards of 300 men in prisoners besides killed, without gaining one single object. As soon as the left of the army had crossed the Esla which was effected without loss. The right moved from Salamanca on Toro where we crossed the Douro. From Toro, we made a very rapid march on Burgos, while General Graham directed his march on the source of the Ebro. When we arrived at Burgos, we saw another instance of that want of vigour and information which did not use to be a characteristic of the French army. A division of French troops was encamped with a river in its rear, over which was only one bridge to retire by, the castle of Burgos which it was natural for the enemy to suppose would soon become an object of attack and which it was their intention to fortify, was in no state of forwardness. The consequence was that this division only escaped annihilation from Lord Wellington not being able to gain (owing to the rapidity of his march) exact information of their situation and force. And the castle of Burgos which in the year 1812 made so fine a defence was in the year 1813 blown up & abandoned.
As soon as this event was ascertained, we changed our direction and advanced by forced marches towards the source of the Ebro and crossed, I believe, one of the strongest rivers, as a military line of defence in Europe, without firing a shot and without even the enemy having the slightest knowledge of it, so little did the French expect, so little had they taken measures to prevent this manoeuvre, that several divisions of their army were still in winter quarters and even when they knew we had crossed, so ignorant were they in what force and in what direction we were marching, that our division while on the march to surprise a French division lying quietly cantoned at a village called Espejo, fell in with, near San Millan, our old friend Maucune on his march (most probably for Vitoria the place of rendezvous) and after rough handling one brigade compelled the other to disperse into the mountains with the loss of all its baggage. The 2nd, 4th & Light Divisions marched direct on Vitoria where a part of the French army was in position and the rest marching on that point only knowing that Lord Wellington’s army had crossed the Ebro, but in what force & in what direction they were marching, they were ignorant. This eminently favourable and commanding situation in which Lord Wellington now stood, resulted solely from that amazing rapidity of movement which brought his whole army in the midst of that of the enemy before they scarcely knew that he had commenced the campaign.
The King of Prussia says that ‘He who at the commencement of the campaign is the most alert to assemble his troops and march forward to attack a town or post, will oblige his enemy to be regulated by his movements and to remain on the defensive.’ This is an advantage that a British army owing to the immense sums of ready money expended on it, possesses beyond any other army in Europe. Lord Wellington has always been and principally for this reason, remarkable for being able at all times to assemble his army and take the field at the shortest notice. It was by availing himself of this, that he arrived at Burgos before it was in a state of defence (for I have heard that palisades and every requisite material for strengthening that fortress were there collected, but the work was not even begun) it was by availing himself of this that he crossed the Ebro without loss and without the knowledge of the enemy (for I have heard that when the French generals were told that the British had crossed the Ebro at Puente de Arenas and thereabouts, they said it was impossible it could not be anything more than a band of guerrillas, that it was not a point practicable for a regular army) and it was by availing himself of this, that he arrived before their position at Vitoria with three divisions of his army, while they were so completely ignorant of what was going on that they knew nothing of any part of the allied army, but what was in their front. While Lord Wellington was moving three other divisions to arrive by other roads at a particular point at a precise and critical moment and was moving two others to cross the River Zadorra in their rear and render their defeat and the loss of their artillery and baggage inevitable.
The Battle of Vitoria is, I believe, an action which effects more credit & honour on the commander that gained it than any other action in the history of war. The event was such as a like combination of able manoeuvres promised, the enemy retreats on Pamplona into which of all his artillery and baggage he brought only one howitzer. It was this rapidity of movement which enabled Lord Wellington to invest Pamplona before it could be provisioned which finally gave him the possession of that celebrated fortress witho
ut the slaughter of a siege.
The campaign was prosecuted with a vigour worthy its glorious commencement and at the same time with a prudence & caution, not intoxicated with success. San Sebastian was besieged, and Pamplona closely blockaded, but at this time Marshal Soult arrived to take command of the French army commissioned by the Emperor Napoleon as his lieutenant to re-establish the affairs in Spain; from this time the palsied and irresolute measures of the French were changed into those that were vigorous and offensive though not attended with success. In the end of July he collected his army, forced the pass of Maya and made a desperate attempt to raise the blockade of Pamplona, Lord Wellington threw back his right, covering Pamplona with five divisions, leaving our division as a disposable force, but not giving up San Sebastian which had repulsed one attempt to storm. Soult made repeated and desperate attacks on Lord Wellington’s position with (as he (Lord W) says) hopes of success even beyond the relief of Pamplona. His attacks were all repulsed and he was finally compelled to retreat precipitately to all the positions prior to his advance after having suffered immense loss.
The siege of San Sebastian was continued and finally the place was carried by storm on the very same day that Soult made an ineffectual attempt to relieve it. Pamplona in the meantime held out and the allied army made no movement of consequence into the interior of France, waiting only for the fall of that place which was known to be much distressed for provisions. At length Pamplona surrendered on the 1st November, on the 10th which was as soon after as the weather would permit, the allied armies made an attack on the enemy’s entrenched position on the lower Nivelle and the enemy withdrew under cover of Bayonne and to the right bank of the Nive. On the 9th of December the right of the army under General Hill crossed the Nive and established itself on the Adour.